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Introduction
1 A deep scholarly divide exists over the benefits versus the costs of free trade agreements
(FTAs),  especially  FTAs between countries  at  different  levels  of  development  such as
NAFTA and more  recently  CAFTA-DR.1 These  agreements  have  been part  of  the  U.S.
approach to neoliberal globalization starting in the 1980s,2 and have been seen as the
beginning of hemispheric integration under the once hoped- for Free Trade Area of the
Americas  (FTAA).  Latin  America  moved  toward  these  integration  schemes,  initially
prompted  in  the  late  1980s  and  early  1990s,  by  significant  economic  and  political
developments such as the debt crisis and end of the Cold War. Regional policymakers
were forced to rethink their approaches to economic growth, moving towards domestic
economic liberalization and integration with world markets. Along with the lowering of
tariff barriers in the 1980s and 1990s, came currency, fiscal, and financial reforms, all
providing  the  context  for  several  free  trade  agreements  with  first  world  countries.
Mexico was the first Latin American country to enter into a free trade agreement with the
United States  and Canada in  1994,  and other  countries  in  the  region have followed.
Several  Latin American countries have also entered into new integration agreements
among  themselves  such  as  ALBA  and  MERCOSUR,  which  exclude  their  first  world
neighbors. 
2 As  discussion  evolved  toward  the  NAFTA agreement  in  1994,  a  robust  transnational
activist  coalition  focused  on  demanding  positive  outcomes  in  Mexico  in  terms  of
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economic gains,  labor rights,  and environmental  protection (Carruthers 2008:137-160;
Graubart 2008). Much debate occurred during negotiations and in the academic literature
as to whether free trade is good or bad for the environment. This essay examines the
institutionalization of environmental concerns, primarily focusing on NAFTA, and argues
that the 1994 agreement should be seen as a positive first attempt to raise the profile of
environmental concerns within discussions of expanding global trade. More specifically,
NAFTA  and  subsequent  U.S.  FTAs  have  contributed  to  the  growth  of  procedural
environmental rights that have the potential to deepen democracy in the wider political
system. Given that free trade agreements represent the U.S. approach to world trade at
present,  this  paper takes the practical  position that building on NAFTA’s foundation,
opportunities  exist  to  continue  promoting  environmental  sustainability  within  these
agreements.
 
Theoretical Overview
A. Environment, Development, and Trade: Differing Perspectives
3 To date, how has social science dealt with the question” is free trade good or bad for the
environment, especially in developing economies?” Economists find some plausibility in
the  notion  of  an  environmental  Kuznets  curve  of  increasing  growth  and  increasing
emissions. They argue that in the early stages of development, if trade contributes to the
increasing  level  of  economic  development,  after  reaching  some  income  threshold,
citizens will demand environmental protection. 3 In fact, a more nuanced version of the
hypothesis is that trade may advance economic growth, and ultimately environmental
protection, but there must be a national commitment to effective environmental policy in
tandem  with  commitments  to  trade  liberalization.  This  analysis  dovetails  with  the
Inglehart  notion based on several  decades  of  analyzing  public  opinion globally,  that
socioeconomic change follows coherent and relatively predictable patterns. Further, he
argues that after reaching some economic threshold when basic needs are met, a majority
of  a  nation’s  citizens  adopt  “postmaterialist  values,”  including  demands  for  a  clean
environment (Inglehart 1995: 379-403).  Documenting such long term trends, however,
does not address the question of what should be done in the short term and medium
terms in rapidly growing economies. Will these emerging economies follow the polluting
path of the old industrializers or will  they be able to “bend the curve” for a cleaner
industrial development? (Naiam 2010:83) The scholarly debate is precisely on whether
and how countries might “bend” the Kuznets curve.
4 Among  academic  analysts,  some  scholars  believe  free  trade  can  help  industrializing
economies  lessen  the  predicted  tendency  toward  environmental  degradation  Ronie
Garcia-Johnson, for example, promoted “the transfer of green technology and practices”
argument in her 2000 study (Johnson 2000). In her research on Mexico and Brazil, Garcia-
Johnson  documented  the  role  of  transnational  chemical  corporations  in  promoting
positive environmental practices via the “responsible care” program. Similarly, Mexican
legal  analyst,  Ximena  Aguirre  Franco,  analyzing  how  environmental  compliance
influenced  mergers  and  acquisitions  by  foreign  firms  in  Mexico,  found  that  as  a
consequence of NAFTA, environmental legislation and compliance had improved as well
as a “race to the top in cross-border acquisitions". A specific finding was that foreign
firms were loathe to acquire firms with soil contamination problems, so both buyers and
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sellers in Mexico had economic and legal incentives to remediate the site (Aguirre Franco
2010: 65-87). Similarly, Maria Del Rosario Barajas E. et al. found that NAFTA was favoring
less  polluting  industries  in  the  northern  maquiladora region  of  Mexico  (Del  Rosario
Barajas 2007: 265-289). This position is, perhaps, efficiently summed up by David Stern
who found that  on  two environmental  markers,  air  pollution  and  energy  efficiency,
neither of the more extreme predictions (negative or positive) have occurred. Rather,
trends present before NAFTA continue and in some cases improve post-NAFTA “but not
yet in a dramatic way.” (Stern 2007: 291-322)4
5 The opposite position held by some social scientists and many activists is that the present
era  of  aggressive  trade  liberalization  promotes  materials-intensive  unsustainable
economic growth, destabilizes local communities, and worsens domestic inequality at the
heart of many environmental ills. Authors such as Paehlke and Newell, for example, point
to the numerous environmental struggles in Latin America and the rest of the developing
world such as: unequal access to natural resources, the siting of hazardous facilities, and
unequal access to participation in relevant policy arenas (Paehlke 2003).5
6 Scholars adopting a middle position on the trade-environment link have simply looked
for common ground between environmental activists and proponents of free trade. One
area  of  interest  overlap  is  on  eliminating  subsidies  “that  are  both  environmentally
harmful  as  well  as  trade  distorting  (Conca,  Dabelko  2010:  122).6 Although  perhaps
adopting a more critical than moderate stance, Gallagher and Zarsky offer a measured
analysis  of  the  trade-environment  link  in  their  study  of  Mexico’s  Silicon  Valley
(Gallagher,  Zarsky:  2007).  Their argument is  that the problem is not necessarily with
trade  itself  but  with  specific  practices  and that  free  trade  may promote  sustainable
development under certain conditions. Specifically, foreign direct investment (FDI) can
aid developing country industries leapfrog to sustainable production systems; this means
minimizing  highly  polluting  production  by  adopting  cleaner  technologies.  The  key,
however,  is  government  policies  in  the  developing  country.  Particularly  beneficial
domestic policies would involve improving national capabilities for innovation through
education and training and supporting domestic companies with credit. 
 
B. The Role of Institutions
7 Unlike some other social scientists, political scientists with an institutionalist focus have
been generally positive about the long-term consequences of NAFTA for the environment
and the architecture of FTAs. What is meant by the theoretical focus on institutional
adoption and evolution over time? In the last two decades, neo-institutionalism has taken
center stage in the social sciences, and key questions concerning institutions are how
they begin, persist, and evolve. Many social scientists use “institution” in a socio-cultural
sense to indicate “habits, decision styles, and social norms" and argue that institutions
persist  due  to  “a  logic  of  appropriateness.”  (March,  Olsen:  1989)  While  for  U.S.
policymakers, environmental concerns are now embedded in free trade agreements as a
socio-cultural norm, one can also consider institutions in a more limited sense, common
in political science, as more or less as synonymous with “formal organizations.” Viewed
through this lens, institutions arise as a more intentional product of human design as
happens in creating environmental mechanisms in free trade agreements. 
8 Often,  neoinstitutionalists  adopt  a  historical  lens  to  track  persistence  or  changes  in
institutions  over  time.  Historical  institutionalists  hold  that  institutions  are  path
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dependent  and  difficult  to  change (March,  Olsen:  1989).  These  historically-based
institutional trajectories carry “the cumulative weight of past choices—which help shape
actors’  preferences,  routines and expectations.” (Rhodes 2006: p.  xv.) Several political
scientists have already analyzed the NAFTA environmental template and changes to it
over time. Therefore, in addition to reviewing this literature and discussing key NAFTA
institutions, the present essay also highlights the ways these institutions may promote
procedural environmental democracy.
 
The Historical Context of the Trade - Environment Link 
9 What was the context for the environmental negotiations building up to NAFTA in 1994? 
10 Environmentalists  first  began  to  push  for  environmental  considerations  in  trade
discussions during the Tokyo Round of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
between 1973-1979;  however,  the first  formal inclusion of  environmental  concerns in
world trade negotiations was the creation of the Committee on Trade and Environment
(CTE) of the World Trade organization (WTO) in 1994.7 Clearly, environmental concerns
had  permeated  trade  discussion  by  the  mid-1990s  since  both  the  CTE  and  NAFTA’s
environmental side agreement came into being at the same time. Significantly, though,
more progress has been made in NAFTA implementation and more recent U.S. bi- and
multilateral FTAs than within the WTO and CTE. This may well be because fewer actors
are involved in the U.S. FTAs than in the WTO with its 153 members.8
11 Israel signed the first free trade agreement with the United States in 1985 and is now the
only  U.S.  FTA  without  an  environmental  side  agreement  or  chapter.  As  NAFTA
negotiations began in the early 1990s, an unrelated case at the GATT helped to mobilize a
transnational  network of  North American environmental  activists.  The 1990-91 Tuna-
Dolphin dispute between the United States and Mexico provided a rallying point  for
activists who opposed the free trade pact. The American government (under pressure
from domestic environmental  groups)  considered closing the U.S.  market to Mexican
tuna since the fish were not being caught in dolphin-free nets. The Mexican government
argued that the U.S. position represented a classic case of "green protectionism” and took
the case to the GATT. The trade organization supported the Mexican position,  ruling
against high U.S. environmental standards. This ruling mobilized environmentalists, who,
now with some concrete evidence, feared that NAFTA would unleash an environmental
“race  to  the  bottom.”  By  1992,  this  worry  prompted  formation  of  an  unusual,
transnational coalition of labor, environmental, and consumer activists as negotiations
for NAFTA proceeded; U.S., Canadian, and Mexican negotiators, well aware of the GATT
decision and its potential after-effects (Chasek 2006: 243). As a result, the trade body’s
decision was quietly shelved and Canadian, U.S., and Mexican NAFTA negotiators came to
accept the need for environmental (and labor) side agreements as part of the treaty. 
 
The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement
12 The environmental concerns around NAFTA were ultimately included in an appendix/
side agreement and not as a chapter in the agreement. This has changed in more recent
U.S. Free Trade Agreements, with all environmental concerns included in the body of the
document.  Notably,  the  side  agreement  mentions  three  specific  Multilateral
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Environmental Agreements (MEAs) that may not be breached to privilege trade; specific
MEA inclusion does not appear again in U.S. trade negotiations until the 2007 Trade Act
and  2009  U.S.-Peru  FTA.9 NAFTA’s  1994  environmental  side  agreement  created  the
following three bodies: 1)The Integrated Border Environmental Program, 2) The North
American Development Bank, and 3) The North American Commission on Environmental
Cooperation (NACEC). We will now examine each.
13 Early  on,  the  transnational  activists  monitoring  NAFTA  negotiations  forced  Mexican
President  Carlos  Salinas  de  Gortari  (1988-1994)  to  pay  significant  attention  to  the
northern  border  with  United  States,  with  its  large  concentration  of  maquiladoras or
assembly  plants.  Thus,  an  early  piece  of  NAFTA’s  environmental  agreement  was  the
Integrated  Border  Environmental  Program.  The  program  has  focused  specifically  on
improving sewage treatment in seven sister cities along the U.S.-Mexican boundary.
14 To fund the Border Program, negotiators created the North American Development Bank
(NADB).  The Bank was established in 1994 and mandated to fund environmental  and
related infrastructure projects within a narrow area of the U.S.-Mexico border.10 After a
decade  in  operation,  the  remit  of  the  bank  expanded;  both  the  U.S.  and  Mexican
governments  passed  legislation  in  2004  to  consider  projects  in  Mexico  up  to
300 kilometers from the border while leaving the distance at 100 kilometers from the
border on the U.S. side. As of August 2008, eighty-eight projects costing over $865 million
had been funded that dealt primarily with water, wastewater, solid waste, and air quality.
About sixty percent of the projects were funded in Mexico and about forty percent in U.S.
border  communities.  The  NADB  represents  a  positive  beginning  for  environmental
protection, but most analysts would agree that the bank is grossly underfunded. While it
had  roughly  $450 million  in  capital  in  2007,  the  World  Bank  estimated  it  needed
$25 billion  per  year  for  ten  years  to  address  the  region’s  needs  (O’Keefe  2009:  452).
Recently, some analysts have suggested expanding the Bank’s geographical and
functional  mandate  to  fund  infrastructure  and  development  projects  beyond  strictly
environmental ones (Selee 2009: 16-17). Indeed, since the Bank is the only existing bi-
national  entity  promoting  development-related  projects,  it  is  increasingly  receiving
proposals to promote economic development in migrant-sending communities. Funding
such projects is unlikely, however, unless the Bank receives a large infusion of capital.
 
NAFTA and Procedural Environmental Rights in
Mexico
15 To date, the most important NAFTA environmental institution, and the one most studied
by  political  scientists  is  NAFTA’s  Commission  on  Environmental  Cooperation  (CEC).
Specifically, the Commission is composed of three bodies: the Council, the Secretariat,
and  the  Joint  Public  Advisory  Committee  (JPAC).  The  Council,  made  up  of  the
environmental ministers of the three countries meets annually; its remit is to authorize
release of environmental information and to initiate inquiries. The Secretariat, located in
Montreal,  produces  reports  and  administers  four  specific  program  areas:  1)
Environmental Information, 2) Environment, Trade, and Sustainability, 3) Pollutants and
Health, and 4) Biodiversity Conservation. JPAC is a citizen advisory group made up of
fifteen members who are appointed by the three member states. JPAC members serve as
citizen advisors to the Council and Secretariat. Mumme and Lybecker’s detailed study of
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the Montreal-based CEC secretariat shows how it has changed over the years to use its
budget more effectively (Mumme, Lybecker 2008).11
16 Missing  from  the  scholarly  study,  however,  is  a  systematic  discussion  of  NAFTA’s
Environmental  Side  Agreements  and  promotion  of procedural  environmental  rights.
What are these procedural environmental rights, formerly called “Principle 10 Rights”
and now more likely to be called “access rights” or “environmental democracy"? These
environmental access rights, the right to information, citizen participation, and justice in
environmental matters, were first adopted as separate laws in the United States between
the 1960s and 1980s. In 1992, these access rights were bundled into “Principle 10” of the
Rio  Declaration,  the  statement  of  principles  emerging  out  of  the  United  Nations
Conference on Environment  and Development  in Rio de Janeiro.  In 1998,  the United
Nations  Economic  Commission  on  Europe  (UNECE)  adopted  this  package  of
environmentally-related  rights  in  its  Aarhus  Convention.  These  procedural
environmental rights apply to all countries in the EU, but Aarhus is open to governments
throughout  the  world  and  is  now  the  global  “gold  standard”  for  procedural
environmental governance (Pallemaertz 2006: 179-203). In short, the reason to care about
these reforms is that information, participation, and access to justice are fundamental in
developing good governance and sustainable development in every country (Payne 2007).
Many “low quality democracies” (and autocracies) acknowledge and may permit these
rights  in  the  environmental area,  without  allowing  them  more  widely.  Still,  many
environment and democracy promoters see the potential for spillover effects from rights
in the environmental sphere to the larger political arena.
 
A. The Right to Information
17 The  right  to  information  is  the  first  procedural  right  demanded  by  environmental
democracy activists.  While NAFTA may not have been directly connected to Mexico’s
Freedom  of  Information  Act,  environmental  activists  who  had  “cut  their  teeth”  on
winning NAFTA’s environmental side agreement were key players in Mexico’s adopting
its Ley Federal de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública Gubernamental (LFTAIPG)
soon after the transition election of President Vicente Fox in 2000. Furthermore, NAFTA
did require a Pollution Release and Transfer Registry (PRTR) or a Registro de Emisiones
Toxicos y Contaminantes (RETC) in Spanish; and as Raul Pacheco Vega has argued, it is
difficult  to  imagine  a  PRTR  without  a  Freedom  of  Information  Act.  The  point  of  a
pollution  registry,  a  report  of  pollution  emitted  by  factories  or  other  polluting
operations, is to change behavior of polluters through indirect civil society pressure; and
PRTRs are considered an essential part of “Community- Right- to- Know” laws. NAFTA’s
CEC has fostered and funded transnational NGO coalitions and these coalitions have been
important in getting Mexico’s PRTR reporting methodology to converge with those of the
United States’ TRI and Canada’s NPRI (Pacheco-Vega 2007: 271). Additionally, although
Mexico, as a NAFTA signatory, was obligated to develop a PRTR, it started as an entirely
voluntary exercise, unlike the U.S. and Canadian mandatory registries. Through the work
of the CEC and the NGOs, Mexico’s PRTR became mandatory and publicly accessible in
December 2001. Still, the first annual report was only published in August 2006, due to
industry efforts to block implementation. In short, the CEC saw as one of its key project
areas to: 1) make Mexico’s PRTR mandatory, 2) harmonize all three countries’ PRTRs, and
3) disseminate much other environmental data electronically. The CEC secretariat claims
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to  be  one  of  the  first  international  organizations  to  make  its  data  available  via  the
internet.
 
B. The Right to Participation
18 At least initially, the Commission on Environmental Cooperation worked on promoting
the “Right to Participate in Environmental Decision making.” Citizens of any of the three
nations can bring complaints to the CEC Secretariat in Montreal or through the JPAC.
Complaints are made through what is known as the Articles 14 and 15 Citizen Submission
process.  As  of  mid-2010,  citizens  or  groups  had  launched  27 complaints  against  the
Canadian government,  38  against  Mexico,  and 10  against  the  United States  for  non-
enforcement of domestic environmental laws.12 
19 In addition to previously-cited Mumme, Lybecker and Pacheco Vega, political scientists
John Kirton, Virginia McLaren, and Jordi Diez, also support the general claim that by
providing  openings  for  citizen  participation,  the  CEC  has  led  to some  positive
environmental outcomes (Kirton McLaren 2002; Diez 2006). Longtime political analysts of
global  environmental  governance,  James  Gustave  Speth  and  Peter  Haas  characterize
NAFTA and its CEC as “almost unprecedented in international relations because it gives
NGOs  and  other  non-state  actors  the  right  to  formally  challenge  the  legitimacy  of
governments’ actions.13 Furthermore, the Council, with representatives from the national
environmental  agencies  of  Canada,  the  United States,  and Mexico,  has  supranational
authority  to  invoke  sanctions,  including  trade  sanctions  if  member  countries  fail  to
enforce  their  own domestic  laws.  This  was  the  first  trade-linked institution to  open
avenues to environmental groups to lodge complaints against any of the three NAFTA
members;  it  provides  a  new  tool  for  citizens,  especially  in  Mexico  with  its  weaker
regulatory capacity, to hold their government and the private sector accountable in cases
of environmental abuse. 
20 A brief comparison between the NAFTA’s CEC and the WTO’s Committee on Trade and the
Environment (CTE) illustrates the small  but significant institutional advances the CEC
represents  in  supranational  environmental  governance  and  specifically  citizen
participation.  Unlike  NAFTA’s  Commission,  the  remit  of  the  WTO’s  CTE  is  only  to
examine:  eco-labeling,  the  WTO’s  interaction  with  MEAs  (of  which  there  are  now
approximately  700),  and  the  effects  of  domestic  environmental  measures  on  market
access. The  CTE,  however,  cannot  make  binding  recommendations.  Finally,  there  is
significantly less room for citizen participation in the CTE than in NAFTA’s CEC. While
NGOs and other civil society groups have gained some presence in CTE discussions since
the Cancun Ministerial in 2003, citizens are only beginning to play the roles of: 1) trade
policy monitors, 2) technical knowledge providers, 3) information disseminators, and 4)
capacity builders, roles NGOs and others have played in NAFTA and other U.S.-FTAs for
over fifteen years (Cameron 2010: 176; Chasek op. cit.: 244, 260).
21 To sum up the state of citizen participation in NAFTA, Speth and Haas,  for example,
temper their praise noting that even with the formal ability of NGOs and other non-state
actors  to  file  petitions,  and though several  petitions have been filed since 1994,  few
challenges have achieved results.14 Thus, similar to other political scientists, Speth and
Haas conclude that NAFTA’s environmental side agreement represents only a first-step in
an ongoing process of including citizen participation in trade –related environmental
institutions.
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 C. Right to Justice in Environmental Matters
22 The third right, to justice in environmental matters, is, perhaps, the hardest procedural
right to gain in most countries of  the world.  Aguirre Franco argues that NAFTA was
responsible for Mexico’s establishing its Federal Prosecutor for Environmental Protection
(PROFEPA)  in  1992.  PROFEPA  was  created  given  the  pressure  to  create  modern
environmental legislation and standards (Aguirre Franco op. cit.: 73-74). PROFEPA is part
of Mexico’s Environmental Ministry, which became known in 2000 as SEMARNAT
23 Briefly comparing the “children of lead” case in Torreon, Mexico, in which plaintiffs used
the Mexican courts to try to win an environmental remedy and the “Cozumel” case using
the NAFTA Article 14-15 complaint submission process illustrates how NAFTA began to
offer Mexicans a potential avenue for environmental justice. Political scientists, Jordi Díez
and Reyes Rodríguez, analyzed the Torreon case in detail, highlighting the difficulty of
attaining  legal  redress  through  the  courts.  This  case  involved  a  Mexican  public
corporation,  Met-Mex  Peñoles,  the  largest  silver  producer  in  the  world,  and  the
extensive, impoverished barrio surrounding the plant. The plant’s pollution posed serious
health risks for decades to the barrio’s children, with the first complaint filed against the
plant  with  the  Federal  Ministry  of  Health  in  1961.  Various  studies  and  complaints
followed until 1998 when a local physician went public about the high lead levels in local
children; he launched a health crusade, complaining to various government ministries
and to the media.  While this  case would have all  the makings of  an “environmental
justice” suit in the United States with some chance of success, it gained little traction in
Mexico, a country where the notion of class–action suits is not part of legal proceedings
and where  establishing  a  firm’s  direct  responsibility  for  harm with  compensation  is
almost impossible (Díez Rodríguez 2008: 161-181).
24 A contrasting legal strategy was adopted in the 1996-1997 Cozumel case.
25 Cozumel  represented  a  successful  challenge  brought  by  transnational  activists  and
provides an example in which the “Article 14-15 process” of NAFTA’s environmental side
agreement worked as intended. As the Mexican government planned a large development
in Cozumel involving a pier, shopping mall and golf course, environmentalists demanded
a natural protected area and alleged that the government had not followed the required
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process for the proposed development. Lacking
“green standing” in Mexican courts, local environmental NGOs used the NAFTA process
instead. This represented the first successful case to go through the entire Article 14- 15
process, and the decision resulted in Cozumel creating a protected area and terminal port
but not the much larger development originally proposed. The case also raised public
awareness and put pressure on Mexico’s Federal Attorney for Environmental Protection
to enforce laws and regulations more effectively. 
26 Impressively,  in  a  1996-1997  case,  the  NAFTA  Article  14-15  process achieved
environmental justice in a way that could not be achieved through the Mexican court
system. Unfortunately  it  is  possible  that  owing  to  this  success,  the  three  NAFTA
governments have made the citizen submission process more difficult (Alanis Ortiz 2002:
186). In sum, NAFTA’s submission process has the potential for serving as an effective
dispute resolution mechanism, but at present, the parties seem unwilling to allow it that
authority.15
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NAFTA ’s Contribution to Institutionalized
Environmental Governance
27 The U.S. now has numerous bi- and multilateral trade agreements with countries around
the world, and the argument presented here is that since the NAFTA template in 1994, it
is  no  longer  possible  for  the  United  States  to  negotiate  a  trade  agreement  without
including  an  environmental  (and  labor)  side  agreement  or  chapter,  and  dispute
resolution mechanism. Environmental inclusion became formalized with President Bill
Clinton’s  Executive  Order  13141,  announced  in  preparation  for  the  WTO  ministerial
summit in 1999, which mandated environmental reviews for all U.S. trade agreements
and included a public comment provision. Congress moved this environmental concern
from an executive order to law beginning with the Trade Act of 2002. It  contained a
general commitment to promote MEAs (but specific MEAs were not included) and also the
general notion that sanctions were an option instead of limiting punishment to fees for
violating labor and environmental protections.
28 Although we cannot argue that the environmental language each U.S. FTA since NAFTA
showed more  specific  concerns  enforcement  “teeth”  over  time,  the  trend  is  in  that
direction. Environmental concerns have moved into the text of the agreements (they are
no  longer  side  agreements)  and  they  also  have  an  explicit  role  in  promoting  the
institutions of  democratic  environmental  governance.16 A comparison of  two western
hemisphere  trade  agreements  since  NAFTA,  the  Central  American  and  Dominican
Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) of 2004 and the U.S- Peru FTA of 2009 will
highlight these points.
29 In  reality,  then,  free  trade  agreements  must  be  seen  as  a  mixed  blessing  for  the
environment, and CAFTA-DR represents the slow and non- linear trajectory of progress.
Notably, CAFTA-DR aroused even more environmental opposition than NAFTA because of
the inability of the Central American governments involved to enforce environmental
standards (Abetti 2008: 14). Still CAFTA-DR has an environmental chapter (Chapter 17)
within the agreement, set up a joint environmental affairs council similar to NAFTA’s
JPAC, and has a Secretariat in San Salvador within the Central American Commission for
Environment and Development (CCAD).  It  has a consulting process for environmental
dispute  resolution  and  strengthened  requirements  for  citizen  participation.  This
environmental  chapter  (and  more  recent  ones  in  U.S.  FTAs)  represents  joint
commitments  to  environmental  cooperation.  The goal  is  to  identify  specific  areas  of
environmental concern and develop work programs that are in fact not specifically linked
to trade liberalization. Funding for these projects is available through the joint U.S. EPA-
U.S. AID program on environmental capacity building. For CAFTA-DR, capacity building
involves: strengthening institutional and legal frameworks, increasing compliance and
implementation  of  Multilateral  Environmental  Agreements  (MEAs),  creating  an  air
pollution monitoring network, improving wastewater regulations, improving solid waste
management,  establishing a  safe  chemicals  management  program,  and implementing
Pollution Release and Transfer Registries. The environmental chapter requires the parties
to create rosters of environmental experts to serve when disputes arise. Finally, the U.S.
agencies  are  also  giving  technical  assistance  and  training  to  officials  in  the  region
charged with environmental law enforcement and implementation. By offering training
to  judges,  lawyers,  and  bureaucrats  in  aspects  of  environmental  law  and  violations
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enforcement,  citizens  of  these  countries  may slowly  begin  to  exercise  their  right  to
justice in environmental matters.17 
30 Similar features are included in all  recent FTAs since CAFTA-DR. However,  there is a
potentially troubling environmental downside to NAFTA, CAFTA-DR and later U.S. FTAs.
NAFTA’s  Chapter 11  provisions,  repeated  in  CAFTA-DR  and  subsequent  FTAs  is  that
multinational  corporations  (MNCs)  can  challenge  domestic  legislation  on  natural
resource development in closed-door international tribunals; thus, a host state may end
up  with  little  say  in  disputes  involving,  for  example,  mining  or  drilling  including
environmental impacts.18
31 Apart from these concerns about the natural resource sector,  environmentalists have
continued to make slow progress in later U.S. FTAs. Van Roozendaal traces the changes
from the U.S.-Jordan FTA in 2000 to the 2007 Trade Act and the U.S.-Panama FTA of 2007
(still unratified by Congress). The key point of the 2007 acts and subsequent FTAs is that
they  signal  “a  shift  from non-committal  references  to  stronger  commitments  to  the
environment” as demanded by Congress (Van Roozendaal 2009: 431). First, seven specific
Multilateral  Environmental  Agreements  (MEAs)  have  been  included  in  all  trade
agreements  starting  in  2007.  Second,  no  longer  does  the  FTA  language  make  the
distinctions between countries at different levels of development. Third, countries are
now obliged not merely urged to maintain high environmental standards rather than
lowering them to attract trade, and fourth, environmental obligations will be enforced
with  remedies,  procedures,  and  sanctions  similar  to  commercial  obligations.
Environmental violations will no longer be limited only to fines (op. cit.:436).
32 Since the U.S.-Panama FTA remains unratified by Congress (as of mid-2010), the U.S.-Peru
FTA  (ratified  and  in  force  as  of  2009)  is  now  considered  “the  gold  standard”  for
environmental chapters of FTAs.19 Sikina Jinnah provides specifics on how the Peru FTA
provided  a  “regulatory  transference  mechanism”  or  leverage  to  provide  a  weaker
multilateral environmental treaty with the ability to borrow enforcement power from a
much stronger trade agreement to fulfill an environmental objective. In this case, a major
environmental  goal  was  to  save  Peruvian mahogany forests,  which had been weakly
protected  from illegal  logging  under  the  1973  Convention  on  International  Trade  in
Endangered Species (CITES). CITES is one of the seven MEAs included in all U.S. FTAs since
2007. Jinnah’s main interest in CITES and the Peru FTA’s Annex on Forest Governance is
that covered MEAs were included in NAFTA but disappeared from U.S. FTAs until 2009
“when they reemerged in a much stronger form.” (Jinnah 2010: 12, 14-16.)
33 While  applauding  the  Peru  FTA’s  positive  implications  for  sustainable  mahogany
harvesting,  she  is  aware  of  the  costly  social  dislocations  that  FTAs  can  cause.  The
Peruvian implementation of the trade agreement involved presidential decrees that had
widespread  implications  for  indigenous  land  use  and  tenure,  which  led  to  major
demonstrations in Bagua Province in June 2009. Still, Jinnah argues that the problem was
not the trade agreement itself but rather the lack of the fundamental access right of
participation in environmental decision making that enraged the residents of the
Peruvian Amazon.20
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Conclusion
34 Despite some protectionist backlash in response to the recent global financial crisis, free
trade agreements remain at the core of global economic activity. 21 What this essay has
argued is that trade and environmental protection are not necessarily opposed to each
other and trade agreements may, indeed, facilitate some improvement in environmental
protection.
35 Trade agreements have not promoted a regulatory race to the bottom. Environmentalists
have seen a degree of success by having environmental issues addressed in the body of
the FTAs, in side agreements on environmental cooperation, and through funding for
capacity building and technical assistance programs (Hornbeck 2007: 30). Yet, activists
must  work  to  expand  upon  the  environmental  chapters  in  these  accords,  including
demanding  improvements  in  enforcement  language,  increased  funding  for  technical
assistance, and establishment of institutions of modern environmental governance.
36 NAFTA’s  environmental  agreement  was  highlighted  because  it  has  served  as  an
institutional  template  for  subsequent  U.S.-FTAs.  It  has  also  served to  link  trade  and
environmental  concerns  in  non-U.S.  economic  integration  schemes  within  the  Latin
American  region  such  as  ALBA  and  MERCOSUR  (O’Keefe  op.  cit:  50).  Perhaps  the
environmental institutions established in NAFTA and later U.S. FTAs might eventually
push WTO members to move towards more transparency and public participation for its
Committee on Trade and the Environment.
37 How  do  we  mesh  our  somewhat  positive  assessment  of  NAFTA  environmental  side
agreements with Zepeda, Wise and Gallagher’s 2009 report? (Zepeda 2009: 16). In their
fifteen- year review of NAFTA’s environmental effects, they found that in recent years,
Mexico had weakened its commitment to environmental protection in manufacturing, in
expanding  industrial  agro-export  farms,  in  increasing  water  use  in  water-stressed
regions, and in increasing use of nitrogen and other agro-chemicals.
38 Our response must be that embedding environmental institutions in trade agreements
and in domestic political systems, more generally, is a long-term process. A new legal
requirement or establishment of a formal environmental cooperation commission is only
a start; but it is a concrete tool for scholars as well as environmental activists. Formally,
this would mean that citizens of any country belonging to an FTA would have access to
relevant  information,  participation,  and  complaint  adjudication  through  the
environmental commission.  As new issues emerge,  it  is  better to have an established
entity than to try to create one anew to promote issue linkages. Thus scholar Michele
Betsill,  for  example,  examines  whether  or  not  NAFTA’s  CEC  might  be  the  place  to
establish a North American carbon-trading system. In this way, the power and authority
of NAFTA as part of a multilevel governance system might be expanded (Betsill  2009:
161-180).
39 In sum we agree with Ron Mitchell who writes, environmental institutions often seek to
promote monitoring, capacity building, and project financing and “although institutions
that induce such efforts seem likely, ultimately, to improve environmental quality, the
fact that such efforts may take three,  four,  or more causal steps removed from such
improvements” may provoke debate on whether these innovations have been successes
or  failures  (Mitchell  2008:  104).  Maybe  scholars  of  environmental  institutions  are  a
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patient lot but we believe that the innovations begun in NAFTA represent early steps in
the slow greening of global trade.
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NOTES
1. NAFTA refers  to the North American Free Trade Agreement and CAFTA-DR is  the Central
American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement.
2. To date (mid-2010), the United States has FTAs in effect with seventeen countries: Australia,
Bahrain, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Israel,
Jordan, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Oman, Peru, and Singapore. Three more (Colombia, Panama,
and South Korea) are awaiting congressional approval.
3. Quan  Li  and  Rafael  Reuveny,  “Democracy  and  Environmental  Degradation,” International
Studies  Quarterly vol.  50 ,  2006,  pp.  935-956.  Also see Gene M.  Grossman and Alan B.  Krueger,
“Economic  Growth and the  Environment,”  Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics  vol.  110  (May 1995):
p.353, 369.
4. This is similar to the argument of Deere and Esty in Greening the Americas, Cambridge: MIT,
2002.
5. Also, Peter Newell, “Contesting Trade Policy in the Americas: The Politics of Environmental
Justice,” in David C. Carruthers, ed., Environmental Justice in Latin America, Cambridge: MIT, 2008,
pp. 49-73.
6. Daniel  C.  Esty  makes  a  similar  point.  See  “Economic  Integration  and  Environmental
Protection,” 2011. 
7. The WTO replaced the GATT in 1994 and all FTAs are also being negotiated within the larger
context of the WTO.
8. WTO members as of 2011.
9. The three covered MEAs are: CITES, Basel Convention on Transboundary Hazardous Waste, and
the Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting Substances. See, Sikina Jinnah, “Enhancing Regime
Effectiveness through Strategic Linkages,” paper presented at the ISA Annual Convention, New
Orleans, February 17-20, 2010. pp. 14-16
10. Data on the Bank may be accessed at www.nadbank.org
11. These  scholars,  too,  find  that  the  targeted  data  the  CEC’s  has  collected  show  that  no
deterioration of environmental standards across the three nations has occurred. 
12. http://www.cec.org (Registry of Citizen Submissions). Accessed 7/27/10. 
13. UNEP, Negotiating and Implementing MEAs, Nairobi, 2007, p. ix.
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14. A  successful  challenge  needs  a  two-thirds  vote  from  the  three  North  American  NAFTA
members.
15. Interview with North American Commission on Environmental Cooperation, Montreal, March
18, 2011.
16. The environmental section of US-FTAs first moved from a side-agreement to the body of the
agreement in the US-Jordan FTA (2000).
17. www.epa.gov/international/regions/sa/caftadr.html Accessed 1/13/2010). 
18. Pacific  Rim  v  El  Salvador,  a  case  (still  ongoing  as  of  7/2010)  that  may  provide  an
environmentally negative precedent within CAFTA-DR and other FTAs. The case was brought by
the  U.S.  subsidiary  of  a  Canadian  firm  against  the  Salvadoran  government.  The  Salvadoran
government has rejected the firm’s Environmental Impact Assessment for a gold mining project,
and  the  firm  has  lodged  a  complaint  via  CAFTA’s  “investor-state  dispute  system"  before  a
mediation panel at the World Bank. If the firm wins, El Salvador will be liable to pay millions of
dollars  in  damages.  See  Kevin  Gallagher,  “Stop  Private  Firms  Exploiting  Poor  States,”
www.Guardian.co.uk,  5  February  2010.  Also,  Gus  Van  Harten,  “Thinking  Twice  about  a  Gold
Rush,” Columbia FDI Perspectives, n 23, May 24, 2010, www.VCC.Columbia.edu
19. Interview with Deputy Assistant USTR for Environment and Natural Resources, July 22, 2010.
20. “Peru’s Natives Hail Decision to Overturn Logging Rules,” New York Times, June 19, 2009, p.
A.13.
21. “Waiting for a Trade Policy,” New York Times, July 6, 2010, p. A22. 
RÉSUMÉS
Après  avoir  fait  la  part  des  différents  arguments  en  présence  concernant  les  liens  entre
commerce et environnement, je soutiens que l’un des aspects positifs, quoique sous-estimé, de
l’ALENA (créée en 1994) et d’autres accords commerciaux récents – bi- ou multilatéraux – entre
les  Etats-Unis  et  certains  pays  en  voie  de  développement,  est  la  création  de  mécanismes
spécifiques visant à promouvoir la gouvernance environnementale et démocratique, ainsi que la
protection de l’environnement. Bien que ces institutions formelles n’aient pas fait preuve, à ce
jour, d’une grande autonomie ni d’une considérable efficacité, elles fournissent néanmoins aux
groupes et réseaux domestiques et transnationaux de la société civile l’un des divers moyens
d’affermir le rôle du citoyen dans la participation aux prises de décision environnementales, et
ce  à  de  multiples  niveaux  de  la  gouvernance.  Elles  peuvent  également  promouvoir  un
comportement  d’entreprise  positif  dans  les  économies  moins  développées.  Bien  que  les
principales  études  de  cas  soient  dévolues  au  Mexique  et  à  l’ALENA,  ces  analyses  peuvent
également s’appliquer à d’autres pays d’Amérique Latine, comme ceux de l’ALEAC-RD et le Chili. 
After sifting through the various arguments on the trade-environment nexus, I argue that an
underrated positive  feature  on NAFTA (1994)  and other  recent  U.S.  bi- or  multilateral  trade
agreements with developing countries, is creation of specific mechanisms to promote democratic
environmental governance and environmental protection. While these formal institutions have
not shown great autonomy and capacity to date, they provide one of several levers for domestic
and transnational civil society groups and networks to enshrine a role for citizen participation in
environmental decisionmaking at multiple levels of governance. They also may promote positive
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corporate behavior in less-developed economies. While the major case study focuses on Mexico
and NAFTA, insights may also apply to other Latin American cases e.g. CAFTA-DR, and Chile.
Tras analizar en detalle los diferentes planteamientos sobre el vínculo entre comercio y medio
ambiente, la autora sostiene que una característica positiva subestimada del TLCAN (1994) y otros
acuerdos comerciales estadounidenses recientes, bilaterales o multilaterales, firmados con países
en  desarrollo,  es  la  creación  de  mecanismos  específicos  destinados  a  promocionar  una
gobernanza medioambiental democrática, así como la protección del medio ambiente. Pese a que
estas  instituciones  formales  no  han  dado  hasta  la  fecha  grandes  muestras  de  autonomía  y
capacidad, sí constituyen uno de los diversos incentivos que poseen los grupos y redes nacionales
y transnacionales de la sociedad civil para confirmar el papel de la participación ciudadana en la
toma de decisiones medioambientales en los distintos niveles de gobernanza. Dichas instituciones
también pueden favorecer comportamientos empresariales  positivos  en las  economías  menos
desarrolladas.  Pese a  que el  principal  estudio de casos se refiere a  México y al  TLCAN, debe
atenderse igualmente a la contribución de otras experiencias en América Latina,  como la del
CAFTA-DR o Chile.
INDEX
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